excerpts from Israel's Winograd Commission report on 2nd Lebanon War

PUBLICKE NOTICE

Vleeptron will be Closed
for a few days.
Bob is going to inspect
the nearest Ocean.

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The unthinkable for the political mindset of Israel:

* war doesn't always get Israel what it wants anymore

* war doesn't make Israel safer anymore

* war doesn't make Israelis feel happier and better about Israel anymore

* the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) doesn't always win anymore

The long-awaited independent Winograd Commission report, investigating last summer's war in Lebanon, was made public Monday (30 April 2007). The original is in Hebrew/Ivrit, of course, but I don't know if these excerpts are an official English translation, or were made by or for ha-Aretz ("The Land"), a major English-language Israeli newspaper.

Already there's some controversy over the Commission's use of the word "charush" to describe the negative aspects of the Olmert government's decision to go to war in Lebanon and its conduct of the war. If a doctor tells you your parent's condition is "charush," does it mean your parent needs a big operation, or does it mean your parent needs a funeral?

A major problem of having the best military in the Middle East, and one of the most effective militaries on Planet Earth, is that year after year and war after war, the citizens come to rely on, depend on, and trust the military more and more -- compared to how Israelis feel about their civilian and democratic institutions. The Knesset (parliament), for example, is composed of about 30 political parties, and is one of the world's most ineffective screaming and squabbling circuses.

So decade after decade, civilian democratic institutions and their frustrating and often corrupt activities drop in the public's esteem, and the IDF and its heroic lightning victories rise in the public's esteem. It's like a military coup, but without the actual middle-of-the-night tanks in the streets and sudden power grab by the military. A military emergency, a state of war that's continuous and never ends, has transformed Israel into the world's only Slow Coup. The military takes over more and more control of the government just by being trustworthy and effective and dependable, and not as corrupt as the civilians. In a society and political culture of civilian clowns, soldiers and fliers who do their military jobs reliably just naturally soak up the limited body of public respect and influence like a sponge.

But now the IDF has not produced its reliable, magical victory. This is going to cause enormous distress and panic to Israelis. Hopefully they'll panic and try to rebuild their civilian and democratic and diplomatic institutions.

There are limits to war, there are limits to the military force solution. Israel just smashed into these limits. They may be forced to try another solution. It's called Peace / Shalom / Salaam.

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from ha-Aretz
daily newspaper, Israel
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Key quotes from the statement by the Winograd Committee

'We impose the primary responsibility for these failures on the prime minister, the minister of defense and the [outgoing] chief of staff. All three made a decisive personal contribution.'

'The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing its nature and implications.'

'The prime minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of his government and the operations of the army. His responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war stem from both his position and from his behavior ... The prime minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one.'

'All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.

'The minister of defense did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations ... His serving as minister of defense during the war impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges.'

'The army and the chief of staff ?were not prepared for the event of the abduction despite recurring alerts. When the abduction happened, he responded impulsively.'

'Israel's government in its plenum failed in its political function of taking full responsibility for its decisions.'

'We hope that our findings ... will not only impel taking care of the serious governmental flaws and failures ... but will also lead towards a renewed process in which Israeli society, and its political and spiritual leaders, will take up and explore Israel's long-term aspirations and the ways to advance them.'